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Abstract
Using an endogenous growth framework,  this paper analyzes  the  impact of
lobbying  for public  goods  on  the  long  run  steady-state  growth  rate  of
the  economy.  A  socially  optimal  level  of  lobbying  can  be  found  to
exist  in  the  absence  of  a  social  planner.  Atomistic  households,
however,  exceed  this  level  by  viewing  taxes  as  fixed,  ignoring  the
aggregate  tax  impact  of  lobbying  via  increased  public  expenditures.
Two  extensions  are  presented.  In  one,  anti-tax lobbying  is analyzed,
drawing  parallel  results.  In  another,  a  quasi-public  good  is
introduced, lobbying for which is  based not on altruism, but on private
gains,  though public gains occur as  a side  effect.
Earlier versions  of this  paper were presented at  the American Economic
Association meeting Washington, D.C.,  December,  1990,  at the  Department
of  Economics,  University  of  Illinois,  Urbana-Champaign,  and  at  the
University of Minnesota Macroeconomics Workshop.  Thanks are  especially
extended to Edward Prescott, Timothy Kehoe, Dani Rodrik and Hadi  Salehi
for  their useful  comments and  criticisms.  Assistance  of  Farong  Li  is
also  acknowledged.  This  research  was  supported  by  the  Economic
Research Service  (contract # 0655  5631).Political Economy of Endogenous Growth
I.  Introduction
Attempts  to  explain  and  understand  variations  in  the  long  run
growth  rates  across  countries,  and  the  related  Baumol-De  Long  debate
(Baumol  1986,  De  Long,  1988)  on  convergence  versus  divergence  of
average  productivities  across  nations,  have  been  accompanied  by  a
re-examination  of the  neoclassical  growth models  and  the  emergence  of
the  new  theories  of  endogenous  growth.  The  major  focus  of  these
theories  has  been  to  attribute  differences  in  the  growth  record  of
countries  to  endogenous  technological  change  (Romer,  1986,  87,  90),
human capital  (Lucas 1987,  Romer,  1990),  or  learning by  doing  (lucas,
1987).  Most recently  Barro  (1990) has  developed an  endogenous  growth
model with public goods,  with the  implication that a key difference  in
the  growth  rates  among  countries  is  attributable  to  the  role  of  the
public  sector.
However,  countries  also  differ  significantly  in  their  political
and  institutional  structure  and  the  importance  of  institutions  in
economic  analysis  is  being  increasingly  acknowledged  by  economists.
Thus,  political  and  institutional  differences  may  play  an  equally
significant  role  in  explaining  why  countries  may  grow  at  different
rates  even  in  the  long run.  This paper  is  a first attempt  to provide
an endogenous growth model  that seeks to  explain variations  in long-run
growth rates by differences not only of the production technologies but
also  of  political  and  institutional  structures  across  countries.  The
specific  institution  that  we  incorporate  into  the  endogenous  growthmodel  is  that of lobbying, i.e.  the  ability  of  agents  to  influence  the
government policy instruments by means of lobbying.
The distinguishing feature of the  endogenous growth literature has
been  its  reliance  on  the  theory  of  externalities.  This
characterization is  seen in all  the models cited earlier.  Existence  of
externalities calls for a social planner whose task is  to  "internalize"
the  externalities,  attaining  a  higher  growth  rate  than  would  be
possible  under  a  private  decentralized  economy.  Alternatively,
however,  other  institutional  arrangements  may  be  envisaged  that
internalize  the  externalities  but  at  the  same  time  retain the  private
agents'  autonomy.  For  example,  Prescott  and  Boyd  (1987)  model  an
overlapping  generation  economy  in  which  private  agents  internalize  the
decision  to  invest  in  human  capital  in  a  dynamic  coalitions  scheme
among  themselves.  In  a  similar  vein,  lobbying  can  be  viewed  as  an
institutional mechanism that internalizes public sector externality and
yet  retains the  autonomy  of  the  private  economy.  In  the  presence  of
market  failure  lobbying  may  be  thought  of  as  the  process  by  which
agents reveal  their desire for the provision of public  goods.  Thus  our
relevant point  of reference  is  Barro's  (1990) analysis  of  the  role  of
public  goods  in  growth.
We  focus  on  lobbying  rather  than  voting  for  its  analytic
simplicity and also  to provide  a comparative perspective  vis-a-vis the
traditional political economy literature.1  Specifically,  the political
See  for example  the  important contributions of Tullock  (1967),  Krueger
(1974) Bhagwati  (1980, 1982),  Findlay and Wellisz  (1982),  Appelbaum and
Katz  (1986) and many others.2
economy  literature has  focused on  static  welfare  effects,  whereas  we
focus  on  dynamic growth  effects.  Also,  in  the  traditional  political
economy literature,  lobbying  occurs  in  the  form  of  rent seeking which
is  purely redistributive  whereas lobbying for public goods  in our model
is  an  "externality  seeking"  activity  and  has  a  socially  productive
dimension.
By  adopting  Barro's  "representative  household"  approach,  we  show
(i),  that in  the  absence  of a social planner, a socially  optimum level
3
of  lobbying  exists  ,  and  (ii),  that  individual  lobbyists  exceed  this
level,  i.e.  they overlobby relative  to what is  socially desirable.  To
elaborate,  lobbying  for  public  goods  internalizes  the  externality
associated  with  their  provision.  However,  it  induces  another
4
externality.  Because  in  a  balanced-budget  economy,  the  burden  of
additional  government  expenditures  as  a  fraction  of  output  drives  up
the  tax  rate  at  the  aggregate  level,  this  effect  will  be  ignored  by
2
An  exception  is  a  recent  paper  by  Cairns  (1989)  on  dynamic  rent
seeking.  Unlike  our  model,  however,  public  goods  do  not  enter  into
Cairns'  analysis.
3
The  first  best  outcome  is  one  where  a  social  planner  would  spend
exactly  the  same  amount  in  the  absence  of  lobbyists  as  would  be  spent
by a government that  is  subject to  lobbying pressures.  This  is Barro's
(1990)  results.  Since  in  this  case,  no  lobbying  cost  occurs,  the
social  outcome  is  a  first best  one.  Our  contention, however,  is  that
this  first best  outcome  is  an  unlikely possibility,  in  a  world where
governments frequently react  to political pressures.
The  analysis  may be  generalized to  the  case  of  a  deficit  economy  if
the  size of deficit is  an exogenous  (although not necessarily constant)
fraction of the GNP.
3atomistic  households  who  see  taxes  as  exogenous.  Thus,  a negative
externality  arises  which  implies  that  the  decentralized  optimal
lobbying  choice  exceeds  its  socially  optimal  level.  This  issue  is
analyzed in  Section  II.  We  derive  many additional  results  and offer
possible  explanations  for  the  differences  in  growth  rates  among
countries  and especially  as  between underdeveloped and  industrialized
economies.
The  issue  of  lobbying by atomistic  agents  raises  questions  about
the  potential  for  free  ridership  regardless  of  whether  lobbying
involves  a  public  good  or  a  redistributive  public  policy  (i.  e.  rent
seeking),  since  even  in  the  latter  case  some  individuals  may  benefit
from  the  lobbying activities  of others.  Specifically, when  the number
of  agents  is  large,  the  dominant strategy could be no  lobbying by  any
agent, or there may be no dominant strategy.  Such issues  are discussed
in  the  public  choice  literature  (e.g.,  Comes  and  Sanders,  1986,  pp.
132-155).  As  is  recognized  in  this  literature,  such  unambiguous
results  are  predominantly  found  in  a  Cournot-Nash  universe  where
conjectural  variations  are  zero,  and  the  presence  of  nonzero
conjectures  can yield different  outcomes.  (Cornes and  Sanders,  1986).
Suppose,  for  example,  that  lobbying  is  public  knowledge  and  that  each
agent  fears  (conjectures)  that  her  shirking  from  lobbying  might  be
replicated by  many  (if  not  all)  others  in  the  economy;  but  if  she  does
lobby,  others  are  less  likely  to  shirk.  Then, agents would know that
any  free  ridership  could result  in  a  dramatic under-provision  of  the
public good.  In this  case,  the  cost of not lobbying to  each agent may
be  high  enough  to  prevent  free  ridership.  Other  features,  such  as
altruism,  attributed  to  the  agents'  utility,  may  also  suffice  to
preclude free ridership.  In this context, Douglass North (1981, p.  49)points  to  the role of prevailing ideology in a society to overcome  free
ridership.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  some  evidence  that  points  to
the  role  of  self-interested  groups  in  influencing  public  policy when
externalities  are  involved  as  discussed  by  Pashigian  (1985)  on
environmental regulation.
Given  the  possibility  of  free  ridership,  Section  III  extends  the
analysis  of  section  II  to  the  case  where  the  good  in  question  is  an
quasi  public good,  so  that  both  a private  and  a public  component are
involved.  Lobbying  then  takes  place  when  there  is  an  agent-specific
private  gain  from  the  public  good  in addition  to  its  public  benefit.
Both  the  private  and  the  public  component  of  the  good  enter  into  the
agent's  production  function, but  the  agent  lobbies  only  in  proportion
to her private  gains, holding the public benefit  of the  good as  fixed.
Public  gains  to  the  society  then  occur  in  the  aggregate  only  as  a
side-effect.  (This  is  very  similar  to  Romer's  (1990)  argument  that
technological  innovations occur by  individual  producers  due  to private
motives  while  the  external  effect  (spillovers)  of  such  innovations  to
society  occur  as  a  side-effect.)  By  allowing  for  private  gains  from
lobbying, then, it  turns  out that  the earlier overlobbying effect which
stems  from  viewing  taxes  as  exogenous,  is  now  countered  by
underlobbying  because  of  viewing  the  public  component  of  the  quasi
public  good  as  exogenous.  The  net  effect  may  then  yield  over-  or
underlobbying depending on the size  of the externalities  involved.
Since  taxes  are  used  to  finance  expenditures  on  public  goods,
another extension of Section  I deals  with a situation where  households
lobby  for  tax  cuts  in  place  of public  goods.  This  is  carried  out  in
Section IV.  In this case a reduction in the  level of public goods will
result  at  the  macro  level  but  atomistic  households,  acting  asmicroeconomic  agents,  ignore  this  effect  and perceive public  goods  as
given (analogous to  the earlier situation.)  Thus,  once again privately
optimal  lobbying  exceeds  its  socially  optimal  level.  Comparing  the
second  best  social  efficiency  of  the  two  types  of  lobbying,  we  find
that  the  conditions  under  which  a  socially  efficient  level  of
lobbying-for-public-goods  can  exist  are  mutually  exclusive  of  those
that  yield  the  possibility  of  a  socially  efficient  level  of
lobbying-for-tax-cuts.
II.  Optimal Lobbying and Endogenous Growth
Consider a representative  infinitely lived consuming and producing
household seeking to maximize the utility function,
00
W-  U[C(t)]e'ptdt  (1)
0
where  C  is  consumption  and  p  is  the  rate  of  time  preference.  With
public goods  as a factor of production, but in the absence of lobbying,
the household budget constraint is  one given by Barro  (1990):
C(t) +  K(t) - (l-r)Y - (l-r)f(K,G)  (a)
where  Y  =  income  (output),  and  K  is  the  capital  stock  and  G  is
expenditures of the  government as  an input into the production function
(all variables  are  in per capita measures),  determined by the  constant
tax rate,  r, and income:
G  - rY.  (b)
With a production function that exhibits constant returns  to  scale  in G
and  K,  but  decreasing  returns  to  K  alone  (since  G  is  given  at  thehousehold level),  the steady-state per capita growth rate of a "planned
economy"  in which  a benevolent  government  maximizes  equation  (1),  on
behalf of households, subject to  (a) and (b) exceeds, for all tax rate,
the  steady-state  growth  rate  of  a  decentralized  economy  in  which
households maximize  (1) subject to  (a),  but ignore equation  (b),  taking
G  as  given.  The  planned economy has  then internalized  an externality
(via equation  (b))  which the decentralized private economy could not.
Against  this  background  we  replace  Barro's  social  planner  by
households  who  retain  direct  maximization  of  (1),  but  are  able  to
influence  (internalize)  G,  via  optimal  lobbying.  Viewing  public
expenditures,  G,  as  being  influenced  by  lobbying  requires,  in
principle,  that  lobbyists  know  the  government's  decision  rule.  In  a
fully worked out model,  this  decision rule  emerges as  the  outcome  of  a
political process  along  the  lines  of Young and Magee  (1986)  or others.
This  is  also the  case with our  two sector generalization of  the present
model  (Mohtadi and Roe,  1990),  currently in progress.  For the present,
however,  in  order  to  retain  the  focus  of  this  paper  on  the  social
versus  private  aspects  of lobbying,  it  is  assumed  for  simplicity  that
such a decision rule  is  already known to  the households.  In this  case,
if B  is  the fraction of income  spent on lobbying, one may write:
G  - g(P,(l-r)Y)  (with g1,g2>0).  (2)
Thus  government expenditures are  a function of the propensity of  income
spent on lobbying and net after-tax income.  An alternative Formulation
of  G  =  g(Q(l-r)Y),  in  which  G  is  a  only  a  function  of  the  total
lobbying  effort  is  equally  plausible,  but  does  not  allow  for  the
separability of  the  function g  that  is  needed  later to  make  the  modelanalytically  tractable.  Besides  gaining  analytic  tractability  and
simplifying  the  final  results,  little  is  lost  by  making  this
assumption.  The budget constraint in equation  (a) is replaced by:
C(t) +  K(t) - (l-f)(l-r)Y
- (l-?)(l-r)f[K,g(,(lY-r)Y)].  (3)
In addition  to  the previous  consumption-investment  trade-off, equation
(3)  entails  a  new  trade-off  between  reduced  income  (by  1-P)  due  to
lobbying  costs  versus  potentially  increased  output  (and  thus  income)
via the  impact of lobbying on per capita public expenditures, G.  Each
household  is  therefore  a  consumer,  a  producer  and  a  lobbyist.
Maximization  of  (1) subject  to  equation  (3)  now  means  that  households
are  able  to  internalize  the  externality  associated  with  G,  by
indirectly affecting  its provision.
Expenditures  G  are  financed by  taxes.  In Barro's  analysis,  the
tax  rate  r  is  either  fixed,  or  set  by  the  government  to  maximize
present  value  of  the  consumer  utility  streams  or  equivalently  the
growth rate.  In either  case,  once  r  is  set by  the  government,  it  is
exogenous  to  the  decision on  expenditures,  G, and  in  fact  drives  the
latter.  By contrast taxes here are driven by the  lobbyists' demand for
government expenditures via a modified version of equation  (b),  i.e:
r =  G/Y - g(9,(l-r)Y)/f[K,g(p,(l-r)Y)]  (4)
The  role of  the  government  in equation (4) is  thus a passive  one.  On
the  one hand, its  sets  expenditures  in response  to lobbying activities;
on  the  other,  it  adjusts  the  tax  rate  to  balance  the  budget.
Individual  households,  however,  do  not  perceive  the  aggregateconsequence  of  lobbying  on  the  tax  rate  at  the margin,  via  its  effect
on the  level  of public  expenditures.  Thus,  as  atomistic  agents,  they
treat  r  as  given,  ignoring  equation  (4)  in  their  optimization
decision,  while  the  tax  rate  does  change  as  a  result  of  collective
lobbying by all  agents.  We believe  that this  way of modeling  lobbying
behavior  reflects  the  reality  rather  accurately,  as  evidenced
anecdotally,  by  the  recent  U.S.  budgetary  experience,  where  lobbyists
favor specific expenditure  increases  to their constituency at  the  going
tax  rates,  and  yet  the  tax  rate  inevitably  rises  in  response  to
budgetary pressures brought  about by increased expenditures.
Before  solving  the  optimization  problem  we  note  an  implicit
constraint  imposed  on Y  in  equation (3) through  the  dependence of Y on
G  and in turn G  on Y,  i.e.:
Y - f[K,g(P,(l-r)Y)]  (5)
Following Barro  (1990),  we  shall  adopt  a Cobb-Douglas  technology with
constant  returns  to  scale  in  order  to  capture  the  steady-state
properties  of the growth process:
Y  - f[K,G]  - KG1a  (6)
Substituting from equations  (2) into  (6) we find:
Y - K[g(p,(l-r)Y)]1-a  (7)
The  "political  technology"  that  maps  one  dollar  of  lobbying
expenditures  to G  dollars  of public expenditures  is  represented by the
function g(8,(l-r)Y).  To  simplify  the  analysis,  but without  loss  of
generality, we assume  that g  is  separable,  such that:
g(P,(l-r)Y) =  (l-r)Yy(P)  (8)As  pointed  earlier,  besides  gaining  analytic  tractability,  little  is
lost  by  making  this  assumption.  Since  g1>  0,  it  follows  that  7' >0.
Further,  we  shall  assume  that  y is  concave  in  f  (7"<  0)  [Also,  for
technical  reasons,  discussed below, we  assume  that 7  is  steep  near the
origin  (lim  7'(P)  - o).]  Concavity  of  7  is  both  necessary  and
P-4  0
sufficient  for  G  to  be  concave  in  BY,  i.e.  for  the  public  sector
expenditures to  show diminishing returns to  lobbying effort and follows
from  the  fact  that  a2g/a(fY)2  =  (l-r)y"(B)/Y.  Diminishing  returns  to
lobbying  effort  occur  because  of  political  constraints  on  the  state.
Such  constraints  render  incremental  increases  in  G  more  costly  at
higher  levels  of  G,  causing  G  to  show  diminishing  returns  with  higher
lobbying effort, PY.
Substituting  for  g(p,(l-r)Y)  from  equation  (8)  into  (7)  and
simplifying the  result permits us  to express Y as a function of K and B
directly:
Y - K[(l-r)7()](  )/  (9)
Equation  (9),  which we may call the  "reduced form" production function,
shows  that  incorporating  lobbying  raises  the  returns  to  capital  from
its  original  decreasing  return  (equation  (6))  to  constant  returns  in
equation  (9).  Constant  returns  obtain  since  lobbying  has  positive
impact  on  output  via  its  impact  on  G  (equation  (2))  and  thus  Y
(equation (6)),  given K.  Thus, a given stock of capital  is  associated
with higher  levels of output Y  in the  presence of  lobbying,  increasing
the  total returns  to  capital.
Since  G  - (l-r)YTy()  and  Y  is  given by  (9)  the  tax  rate,  r,  in
equation (4) becomes:
10r  - y(P)/(l1+Y())
Note  that  r  >0.  This  equation  now  clearly  shows  that  the  tax rate  is
lobbying-driven.  Moreover,  since  0  s  Ir  1,  it  follows  that  0  _  7(p)  5
1.  [We  allow  for  the  possibility  of  finite  G  even  in  the  absence  of
lobbying  such  that  0  5  7(0).  See  below.]
Privately Optimal Lobbying:  Equilibrium Path
Substituting for Y from equation (9) into  the  expression following
the  first  equality  in  (3),  the  budget  constraint  is  re-expressed  as:
C(t)  - (l-)(-) 1 /K(t)[(P)](l1-)/  - K(t)  (11)
The  three  variables  ~,  C  and  K  are  chosen  by  the  now
consumer-producer-lobbyist  households,  for  given  7.  Substituting  for  C
from  equation  (11)  into  equation  (1)  transforms  the  choice  variables
from  C  to  K,  and  P  so  that  the  integrand  becomes  U[C(t)]  - V(t,P,K,K).
Application  of  Euler's  equation  for  K  and  8,  to  the  transformed
integrand,  and  using  an  iso-elastic  utility  function,
1-0-
U(C)  - [C  -l]/(-a),  (12)
one  finds:
1  1/  (  (13) A  (  )*  (  l-)-r)  [(6)]  - p  ,  (13) C  [  [1P  -I-a
and,
Y  (1-)a  -(14)
-7(Y*)  (1-a
The  second  order  condition  requires  that  the  integrand V  be  strictly
5
concave  in  t  and  K.  Appendix  (ii-l)  shows  that  this  is  globally
Note  that  unlike  static  optimization  this  is  a  second  order  necessary
11
(10)satisfied  in  K  and  locally  satisfied  in  f.  It  is  important  to  note
that P*  in equation  (14) not  only maximizes  the utility  streams W but
also  the growth rate  A.  (From equation  (13)  the aX/ap  - 0 reproduces
6
equation  (14);  additionally,  A  is  negative  .)  For  3*  in  (14)  to
exist, it  is  sufficient that the political technology be steep near the
origin  (lim  7'(-  ) - c)  (Appendix  ii-2).  With  this  assumption,  the
a  ->  0
function 7  does  not need to be  (though  it  can be)  zero  at  the  origin,
i.e.  y(0)  >_ 0,  which  implies  that  some  finite  investments  on  public
goods  can  (though need not)  occur even in the absence  of lobbying.
In equation  (13),  A is  the household's  expected growth  rate  since
it  is  based on  the household's view  of a fixed r.  r, however, varies
in  the  aggregate,  responding  to  the  collective  lobbying  effort.  To
reconcile  this, household expectations must be realized at  equilibrium,
yielding  a  tax  rate,  r ,  that  corresponds  to  this
expectation-realization  condition.  Before  discussing  this,  however,
note  that  the  constancy  of  r at  the  micro  level  and  its  variability  at
the macro  level means  that  in  addition  to  the  positive  externality of
G,  internalized  by  lobbying,  lobbying  itself  introduces  a  negative
externality on society (via taxes) which is not internalized.  Thus  the
social marginal value of lobbying  for aggregate growth will differ from
its  private  marginal  value  for  household  growth  rate.  In particular,
substituting  from  equation  (10)  into  the  value  of  r  in  (13),  the
A
aggregate growth rate for the society, A, becomes:
condition for the  concavity of W.  For further discussion of this point
see M  Kamien and N.  Schwartz  (1981),  pp. 37-42.
This follows  from using the CBB <  0 condition in Appendix ii-1.
PP
121  1-a
= 1  1i+  )  (1-).[  1  - p]  (15)
A
More  on  the  comparison  of  A  and  A  later.  For  the  moment,  note  that
equilibrium  occurs  when  agents  find  the  true  tax  rate  where  the
perceived  growth  rate,  for  optimum  P*,  A(P*;r)  equals  the  aggregate
A
growth rate,  \(,*),  evaluated at P*,  i.e.:
A
A(*";r)  - A(P*)  (16)
The left hand side A(P*;r)  is  given by equation  (13)  and the  right hand
side  by  equation  (15).  Setting  the  two  equal,  it  follows  that
the  tax  rate  satisfying  (16)  is:
S-  7(*)/(1+7(*))  (17)
o
The  equilibrium  growth  rate  is:
[i-a A  - [(l*  01/  *)]  - '  (13')
where  r  is  given  by  equation  (17).  Equation  (13')  shows  that
household  consumption  grows  at  a  steady  state  rate  and  has  no
transitional  dynamics,  because  A  depends  on  the  parameters,  a  and  r
(assumed fixed by the household)  and P.  This  steady  state  growth will
of  course  imply  that  the  capital  stock  also  grows  at  the  same  rate.
To  examine  the  impact  of  production  technology  on  optimal
lobbying, we implicitly differentiate equation  (14)  to find:
2
d_*  7  1)  <  0 <  0.
di  2  2
[-y'+  (l-3)Y"].·  - (1-8)7'
2   (1-a) 2
Result la.  As  the share of capital  in  aggregate output increases,  the
optimal propensity to lobby for public goods declines.
13A  higher  capital  share  implies  a  lower  share  of  the  public  sector  in
output.  This reduces  the  incentive  to  lobby for G.  If a higher  share
of  capital  implies  a lower  intensity  of  lobbying, how  does  it  affect
the  equilibrium  growth  rate?  Using  the  envelope  theory,
dA [f9*(a),a]/da - aAo/a,  which  means  that  only  the  explicit  dependence
of  A  on  a matters.  Then  from equation  (13)'  and  (17)  we  find  that
0
2
8A  /aa  - -(A +p/a).ln[7(P*)/(l+7(9*)]/a2  which  is  positive.  To
summarize:
Result  lb:  The  equilibrium growth  rate  is  an  increasing function  of
the  private capital productivity parameter  (aA 0/8a  >  0),  and  thus  a
decreasing function of  the  public investment productivity parameter.
These  results  provide  a  possible  explanation  for  the  observed
variations  in  growth  rates  across  countries.  For  example,  evidence
generally suggests  that underdeveloped economies  tend to  have a larger
share  of public  to  private investments  than industrialized economies.
Correspondingly, some underdeveloped economies seem to have experienced
lower rates  of  growth  than  the  industrialized  economies,  as  suggested
by the Baumol-De Long debate  (Baumol, 1986;  De Long, 1988).  Result Ib
corroborates  this  finding,  while  result  la  suggests  that  this
experience  is  simultaneously  associated  with  a  high  extent  of  interest
group  lobbying  among  underdeveloped  economies.  (See  also  result  5
below.)
Note  that  since  the production process  is  normalized  to  a  per  capita
basis,  the  share  of  labor  is  relegated  to  a  numeraire  status.  Thus,
the  comparison  is  between the  share  of private versus  public  capital,
not between private capital, public capital and labor.
14Socially Optimal Lobbying:  Efficient Path
If  an  institutional  arrangement  could  bring  to  bear  the  social
marginal  cost  of  lobbying  (via  aggregate  tax  effect)  to  individual
lobbyists  what  would  be  the  impact  of  lobbying  on  aggregate  growth?
This  is  a  familiar  problem  of  internalizing  an  externality.  One  may
then  search  for  a  nonzero  value  of  9,  say  ,**,  that  maximizes  the
A
society's  growth  rate,  A,  analogous  to  the  value  of  3*  that  maximized
A.  Differentiation equation (15)  in P:
1
-- 2
ii+•(3) a8 l /8  ~  (1y)I [  (1a)Y()[l-a -l+Y7 (U)  ]  (18)
A
Setting  AX/ap  to  zero, P must solve  the  equation:
Y  (  **)  P**a) -a(19)
7(i**)  *  1  - a  - 7  (*)  /  [  1+ (**)]  (19
Provided  that  -y(6)  is  steep  near  the  origin,  Appendices  (ii-3)  and
(ii-4)  show  that  the  necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  6**  in
A
(19)  to  exist  and  to  maximize  A  is  that  7(/**)  <  (l-a)/a  or,  using
(10),  that  lobbying-driven  taxes  at  the  social  optimum  be  such  that
r(P**)  <  (1-a)  . Thus,  a  social  optimum  lobbying  exists  if  the
corresponding  tax  rate  is  less  than  the  productivity  parameter  of
public  investments;  otherwise  taxes  will  outweigh  the  contribution  of
public  good  to  national  output:
Result  2.  Given  certain conditions,  there  exists  a  nonzero  level  of
lobbying  that  is  socially optimum  in  maximizing  aggregate growth  rate
(in  the  absence  of  a  social planner that  could  provide  a  first  best
outcome).
15It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  privately  optimal  and  the
socially  optimal  lobbying.  Comparing  *  and  f**  directly  from
equations  (14) and  (19)  does  not seem promising.  Instead, we follow a
A
different technique, comparing the behavior of A(f)  at f* with A(3) at
ft**.  From equations  (13)  and  (15),  which differ only by the  constancy
of  r  in  (13)  and  its  replacement  with  7( )/[1+7(()]  in  (15),  the  slope
A
of A can be expressed in terms of the  slope of A:
1  1 1-  1-a  -
a8/a8  - [l.a/  - - a+p  ]  '  ( )   (20)
A
Since  a8/aA8if  - 0,  it  follows  from  equation  (20)  that  al/8apl,  < 0,
A  A
i.e.  A(,)  is  downwardly  sloped  at  *; also,  since  8A/8p** - 0, it
follows  from  (20)  that  8A/a•j**> 0, i.e.  A(P;r)  is  upwardly sloped at
ft**.  Therefore  it must be  that ft**  < P*, as  is  shown in Figure  1.
Result  3.  Private agents'  optimal  level  of  lobbying  is  socially
excessive and  thus  suboptimal,  as  they  view  the  tax rate as given.
^  8
Figure  1  depicts  the  curves  A(P;r (0*))  and  A(f)  . In  accordance
o
with  equations  (16),  the  peak  of  the  curve  A at  B* coincides  with  the
A  A
value of A at  *.  Thus A(f)  goes  through the maximum of A(p).  This  is
the  equilibrium  rate  A  given  by  equation  (13)'.  As  we  see,  the 0
equilibrium growth  rate  A (0*),  is below  the  maximum  potential  growth
A 0
rate,  A(f**),  but  8*  itself is above  O**.  Thus:
8For  the  purpose of  drawing  the  curves near  the  G  -0 endpoint,  it has
been assumed that,  lim  y(/)  =  0, as f---  0.  However, this  is only for
illustration and  there  is  no need for  y7(3)  and  thus  G to be  zero  when





Figure  1.  Growth  and  Lobbying  for  Public  GoodsResult  4.  Actual  growth  rate based  on  privately optimal  lobbying  is
less than potential aggregate growth under socially optimal lobbying.
Figures  2a  and  2b  represent  the  numerical  counterparts  of  figure
1.  Both  figures  are  based  on  a  production  technology  parameter  of  a  -
0.6,  but  differ  in  the  political  technology  parameter;  7(9)  - .2 1 2  in
figure  2a  and  7y()  - .4p 2/ 3  in  figure  2b.  Thus,  figure  2b  represents  a
political  technology  that  is  more responsive to  lobbying.  In  figure  2a
the  privately  optimal  lobbying  and  the  equilibrium  tax  rates  are l*-1/4
and  r  - 0.09;  in  figure  2b  they  are  9*-1/3  and  - .149.  Despite
this  increase  in  the  tax  rate  and  the  lobbying  intensity,  the  more
responsive  political  technology  of  figure  2b  implies  a  higher
equilibrium  growth  (A)  (from  0.038  in  figure  2a  to  0.059,  in  figure
A
2b).  Correspondingly  the  maximum  growth  A*  is  also  higher  in  figure  2b
than  figure  2a.
It  is  possible  to  construct  a  measure  of  efficiency  loss  related
to  the  agents'  overlobbying,  and  then  study  the  comparative  statics  of
this  measure  in  steady  state.  One  such  measure  is  the  difference
between  the  maximum  heights  of  the  two  growth  expressions,  which  in
Figure 1, is  a positive number.  Let i  represent the  difference.  Then,
A  A  A
e  - A*  - A  - A[A**(a),a]  - A [*(a),a].  Since  A*  and  A  are  maximized
0  0  0
at  8**  and  8*,  only  the  explicit  dependence  on  a  matters  (by  the
envelop  theory),  as  was  discussed  preceding  Result  la.  Then  repeating
the  earlier  procedure  by  computing  the  derivatives  from  equations  (13)
A
and  (15)  and  re-expressing  them  in  terms  of  A  and  A*,  we  find:
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Since  9** < 8*,  and A* > A it  follows  that  dt/da >  0  :
0
Result  5:  The  efficiency  loss  of  overlobbying for public  goods,  in
terms  of  reduced  growth  rate,  is  greater,  the  larger  is  the
productivity parameter of  capital stock  (a) and  the smaller  is  that of
public sector  (1-a).
III.  Quasi Public Goods
The  preceding  analysis  is  valid  either  if  individuals  are
altruistic  or  if  the  size  of  coalition  is  small  to  rule  out  free
ridership,  as we discussed in the Introduction.  Of these  possibilities
the  second,  i.e.  the  small  size  of  coalition,  may  be  difficult  to
sustain in the face of the assumption of atomism which  is necessary for
the  argument  that  household  perceive  a  fixed  tax  at  the  micro  level.
Thus,  if a coalition is large  so  that the  assumption of atomism can be
retained,  but  altruism  is  not  considered  a  viable  assumption,
individuals must have a self-interest  in  lobbying  for public goods,  so
that  free  ridership does  not  occur.  In  line with  this  idea,  in  this
section  we  assume  that  there  is  a  individual-specific  or  private
component  to  public  goods  as  well  as  a  public  component.  This
departure  from a pure public  good,  in addition perhaps  to  its  greater
realism, allows for self-interested individuals  to affect the extent of
the  private  component  of  the  public  good  that  they  see  as  benefiting
,  7(8**)  7(0*)
Since  p**  <  p*,  it  follows  that  In  1 +  **)  <  In  1 +  (*)<  0.
Taking  absolute  value  of  both  sides  reverses  the  inequality  signs.
A
Multiplying the  left  side of  the  first  inequality by A*  +  p/a  and its
A
right by A +  p/a and noting that A* >  A  ,we  find that de/da > 0. 0  O
18them.  However, in the process, the  government input is  affected at the
aggregate  by  the  activity  of  all  individuals  involved.  This  latter
factor  introduces a new externality which we  shall discuss below.
Consider  a  community  of  n  identical households.  The  production
function of each household is  given by:
y  - f(k,g)$(G/y)  (la)
where  k  is  the  household's  capital  stock  and  g  is  the  household's
perceived  own  benefit  derived  from  the  public  input  whose  aggregate
level  is  G.  G  is  a  nondivisible  input  that  also  enters  into  the
household  production function.  Households  cannot  affect  G  directly,
but  it  is  assumed  that  they view the  ratio  of  G/y  as  a constant much
along Barro's view (1990 Section IV),  in which the benefit one receives
from a nondivisible public  service is  considered proportional  to  income
(though in  this  case  it  is  the  aggregate  government  input,  G,  rather
than  its  per  capita  amount,  which  is  considered  proportional  to
income).
The view that underlies  the above formulation of the model is  that
as  households  lobby  in  proportion  to  their  private  benefits  from  the
public  good  (see  below),  they  induce  a  collective  pressure  on  the
government  for  increased  G,  as  will  be  seen  below.  G  however,  is
nondivisible  and  therefore  becomes  available  to  all  households.  To
illustrate,  suppose households in  a community desire  a new road.  Each
household's  incentive  in  lobbying  the  local  authorities  would then  be
proportional  to  its  benefit  from  the  introduction  of  the  road,  though
the  road  is  of  course  a  nondivisible  input  in  that  it  cannot  be
constructed on a piece-wise basis.
As  each household sees  g  to be  a  function of its  lobbying effort,
19we  assume  a  form  similar  to  that discussed  in  Section  II:
g - g(3,(l-r)y) - (l-r)yy(f)  (2a)
where  7  possesses  the  properties  discussed  earlier.  Assuming  that  y
exhibits  constant  returns  in  k  and  g  and  is  increasing  in  G/Y,  we
write:
y  kg  -(G/y)  (3a)
Substitution  form  (2a)  into  (3a)  gives  the  "reduced  form"  production
function:
y  - k[(l-r)(p)]  (G/y)/  (4a)
The  household  will  then  maximize  equation  (1)  subject  to:
c(t)  +  k(t)  - (l-p)(l-r)y  (5a)
Following  the  procedure  of  the  previous  section,  the  perceived  optimal
growth  path  is:
11/a  1-
A  - (l-p)(1-r)  [y()]  a  (G/y)  - p,  (6a)
in  which  G/y  ratio  is  treated  by  households  as  fixed.  In  this  case
then  the  optimal  lobbying  propensity  is  given  by  exactly  the  same
equation as Section II:
Y'  (#*)
(1-)  - (-  (7a)
and  the  concavity  of  A  also  is  governed  by  the  analysis  of  Section  II.
Aggregation and Equilibrium Path:
As  mentioned  above,  nondivisibility  of  G means  that  a  unique  level
20of  the  public  input  G  will be  provided  in  response  to  the  collective
pressure  of  lobbyists.  To  simplify  the  analysis,  we  assume  that  the
same  mapping  g  that  converts  lobbying  effort  to  g  at  the  household
level  also operates  at the aggregate  level,  though in general  this need
not  be  the  case.  Since  households  are  identical,  aggregate  G will be
provided by the government according to the  following functional form:
G  =  g[,(,(l-r)ny]  - (l-r)nyy(f)  (8a)
Variable  n  captures  the  size  of  the  coalition  that  is  engaged  in
lobbying.  The  coalition  size  is  assumed  to  be  a  given  parameter  and
thus  exogenous.  Although  n  may  be  related  to  the  population  size,
growing as  the  latter does,  such a growth would still be  exogenous and
thus  not change  the  qualitative nature of the  results.  The  tax rate  r
is  determined  as  before,  r - 7(f)/(1+7(P)),  based  on  the  assumption
that  only the  coalition members  are  taxed,  G  rny.  The  equilibrium
tax  rate  at which expectations are realized is  given by:
r  - y(P*)/(1+7(,*))  (9a)
0
This  equilibrium  tax rate,  together  with  the  coalition  size,  uniquely
determine  the  G/y  ratio  in  equilibrium,  from  (8a)  and  (9a),  and  then
the equilibrium growth rate, from equation (6a).1  These equations are:
(G/y)  - (1-r )n7(,*) - n[y(*)/(l+7(p*))],  (10a)
0  10
The  constraint that  the growth rate A  is <  1,  imposes an upper bound
on  e,  i.e.,  n  [7(A*)/(1+7(p*))]+  /(1-f*)/7(*)  - a+p.  Thus  the
externality  parameter,  e  cannot  be  too  large  since  n  may  be  a  large
number  (For example  a  value  of  E  =  .2a  would quickly dampen  the value
of ne/a  even for very large n.)
21and1 1
1  1)  /a A-  I  (l-*)(l-r  )/y7(_*)  ](c  (G/y)  - p*  (1a)
Social Optimum and the Efficient Path:
The  efficient  path  is derived based  on  the  notion  that  in  the
aggregate,  r and  G/y  depend  on  the  level  of  lobbying  according  to
equation  (9a)  and (10a) for any  3 (allowing us  to  drop  the  subscript o
and  superscript  *).  As  in  Section  II,  this  concept  of  efficiency  is
again  a second best  concept  and  is based  on  the  assumption  that  the
socially  optimal  allocation  of public  goods  by a social planner--i.e.
free  of lobbying costs--is improbable, though clearly socially superior
in  theory.  Substitution  from  (9a)  and  (10a)  into  the  equation  for  A
(eq. 6a) gives:
A1  1-
S  I/  I-)  1  - n  '  ()  , A"(1  i+-(.  ]   [y(  )]  [nil+( ]   - (12a)
The  nature  of  the  trade-offs  in  this  expression  is worth  noting.  In
analogy  to  Section  II,  the  first  two  terms  respectively  capture  the
negative  impact  of  lobbying  on  growth  via  resource  use  and  taxes,  and
the  third  term  captures  the  positive  impact  of  lobbying  on  growth  via
the  household-specific  benefits  of  the  public  public  good,  g.  In
T 1he  dependence  of  A  on  n,  via  equation  (10a),  points  to  the
0
appearance  of  what  is known  as  "scale  effects"  in  determination  of
steady-state  growth.  (An example  of  such  scale  effects  is Romer's
(1990)  analysis  of  the  role  of human capital).  While  this  may be  an
important  issue  in  its  own  right,  its  discussion here  would  take  us
beyond the  scope of this paper and is  not therefore pursued further.
22addition,  the  fourth  captures  a  new  effect.  This  is  the  impact  of
privately  motivated  lobbying  on  the  total availability  of  public  input,
A
G.  The  value  of  9**  that  maximizes  A  is  give  by:
____**)  a (1-  a  **  (13a) r(#**) (  - r("**) 1  - a  +
1+7 (**)
Note  that  this  expression  reduces  to  the  equivalent  expression  in
Section  II  for  e=0.  Provided  that  7($)  is  steep  near  the  origin,  as
before,  Appendices  (iii-l)  and  (iii-2)  show  that  the  necessary  and
A
sufficient  conditions  for  **  to  exist  and  to  maximize  A  is  that
political  technology  at P**--or  its  required  tax--is  bounded  from  above
such  that  7(3**)/[1+y(f**)]  - 7(3**)  <  1  - a/(l+e).  This  is  more
relaxed  condition  than  in  Section  II,  but  reduces  to  that  when  e  -0.
In  order  to  compare  the  socially  and  privately  optimal  lobbying,
A
we  focus  once  again  on  the  slopes  of  A at  l** and  of  A at  8*.  The  two
slopes are  related through the  following relation:
E  1
a^/a=  n/(l+7)a  1  a  1/  -
G/y  [(1-r)(l+-y)
1  1
1 -a+e  - 1-2a+E  -
'-  -y  +  a  +  (l  )[  a 7"  '  (14a)
aa  1 +a+6  u  1 +a+e
(1+7)  (1+7)
This  relation  is  analogous  to  equation  (20)  but  it  contains  an  extra
third  term  introduced  by  the  presence  of  the  external  effect,  e.  At  p*
the  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side  vanishes,  leaving  the  sign  of
A
ax/8a  to  be  determined  by  sum  of  the  second  term--which  is  analogous  to
Section  II  and  captures  the  negative  effect  of  overlobbying  by  private
household's  viewing  of  the  tax  rate  as  fixed--and  the  third  term.  This
23terms is new and captures the positive effect of the public good on the
A
economy.  The existence of this  term implies a shift rightward of the A
A
curve  in Figure 1, as  shown in Figure  3, so  that the  slope of A at P*
is less negative than before  (Figure 3a),  or even positive  (Figure 3b).
The  consequence  is  that  the  value  of  f**  is  larger  than  it  was  in
Section II when the  external effect was  absent.  If the external  effect
A
is sufficiently  large,  the  A curve  shifts  so  far  to  the  right  as  to
cause 3**  to  pass  the value  of f*,  a possibility  shown  in Figure  3b.
Thus  the  extent  of  overlobbying  relative  to  the  social optimum  falls,
and  may  even  turn  into  underlobbying,  the  larger  is  externality
coefficient  e, capturing  the  degree  of  publicness  of  G.  Atomistic
households  overlobby to  the extent they  ignore aggregate  tax variations
driven by the total level  of lobbying in  the society, but underlobby to
the  extent  they  ignore  public  (external)  benefits  derived  from
lobbying.  We  can  find when P**  stays  to  the  left  of  f* and when  it
surpasses P* by evaluating equation (14a) at  C*  and simplifying  to  get:
1
A  1  -c~+  --
8A/8  1-[  ]a.  '.[-1  +  E/7] Go  1  ++  "+E a*  (1+7)
A
Therefore,  if  the  externality  is  such  that  e <  7,  8A/8aV.l  <  0  and
therefore  f** <P*.  On the  other hand, if  the  externality parameter is
large,  i.e.,  e  >  7  (but  not  so  large  that  growth  rate  exceeds
A
unity--see note  12),  aA/lafi.  > 0 and therefore  6**  >f*.  To  summarize
this  discussion:
Result 6.  Atomistic households overlobby  to  the  extent  they see  taxes
as  fixed, but  underlobby  to  the  extent  they  ignore  public  (external)
benefits derived from lobbying.  Overlobbying dominates  if the external
effect is  small  (e<y)  and underlobbying dominates  if it  is large  (E>y).
24ieter.  Fe2>
leter  e.>e2 >e 1







Figure  3.IV.  Growth Under Lobbying  to Reduce  the  Tax Rate
It  is  equally possible that agents  lobby  to  reduce  the  tax rate.
Individual households  perceive  a given  level  of public  goods,  but  the
aggregate provision of  the public good is  affected at the  economy-wide
level  as  a consequence  of  the  efforts  of  all households  to  reduce  the
tax rate.  The  fact that households  ignore this  externality means  that
privately  optimal  lobbying  by households  exceeds  its  socially  optimal
levels.  The  analysis  is  therefore  similar  to  Section  II,  but  in
reverse fashion.  Since  the provision of  the public  good is  now given,
the  issue of free ridership does not arise,  at least with respect  to G,
and hence  the  distinction between Section II  and  III  is  irrelevant,  in
so far  as  the question at  hand is  taxes  and not G.  This  is  the  reason
for  returning  to  Section  II,  as  the  reference  point  for  the  analysis.
Finally, it is  not possible to model simultaneous  lobbying for  tax cuts
and  increase  in  the  provision  of  public  goods  in  a  single
representative  household  model,  since  that  would entail  contradictory
objectives.  Such a model, however, can be worked out in the context of
a two household model.  But  this goes beyond the  scope of this paper.
In this section, households  continue to maximize equation (1),  but
G is  now fixed to  the  individual households.  Instead,  it  is  the  total
tax bill  of a representative household which is  subject to lobbying:
T - rY - 9(8,(1-r)Y)  (with 01,82<0)  (2b)
Let  (fI,(l-r)Y) assume a separable form in analogy with Section II:
0(B,(1-r)Y) - (l-r)Y6(9)  (3b)
where 6 captures  the political technology such that 6' < 0, and 6" > 0;
25i.e.,  6'  declines  in  absolute  value  to  capture  the  diminishing  returns
feature  of the political  technology,  as discussed earlier.  Also,  6 is
assumed steep  near zero  (lim 6'(p)  - -c),  for  same technical reasons as
p  0
before.  Equations  (2b)  and  (3b)  yield:
S-=  6(5)/(1+6(p))  (4b)
[In analogy  to  the  previous  case, we  assume that  6(0)  >  0, permitting
for  the  possibility  of  a  tax  rate  ceiling  (<  1),  in  the  absence  of
lobbying.  See below.]  Substitution  into the budget constraint yields:
C(t)  +  K(t) - (1-8)[1  - 6(]Y
- (1-l)[1 - 6  ]f(K,G)  (5b)
1+6(o)
As  mentioned,  G  is  now  constant  at  the  level  of  the  individual
household  but  is  driven,  at  the  macro  level--this  time  indirectly--by
the  lobbying efforts  to  cut  taxes,  i.e.:
G  - rY-  6()  Y  (6b)
1+6(p)
With a constant return to  scale  technology of  Sections  II  and III,  the
above  equation  can  be  used  to  yield:
G   K[  i)  (7b)
1+-(p)
Since  atomistic  households  view  G  as  fixed,  this  equation  does  not
enter  into  their  maximization  decision, but  the  effect  shows  up  when
one  searches  for  a  socially optimal  growth  rate.  More on  that  later.
For  the  present,  maximization  of  (1)  subject  to  (5b)--after  its
incorporation of  the  C-D  technology--yields  a  perceived optimal  growth
rate  of  consumption  (and  capital  stock)  of  representative  household,
26and an optimal lobbying propensity, given by:
1  ie  G  i-
S-  a( 1-l  1+6()'  -K  p  (8b)
and,
-6'(B*)(1-p*)  - 1+6(O*)  (9b)
Appendix  (iv-l)  then  shows  that  the  second  order  condition  for  the
maximization  of  (1)  is  satisfied  in  K  (globally)  and  6  (locally).
Further,  as  in  the  earlier  case,  a  9* that  solves  equation  (9b)  will
always  exist  if  the  political  technology  is  steep  near  the  origin,
(lim 6'(P)  - -C.  See Appendix iv-2). 1 2
3-  0
To  find  aggregate  growth  we  substitute  from  equation  (7b)  into
(8b):
A  1  6()  (l-c)/a A-  -a(1)  +s  )  )[  ]  - (lOb)
Then  in equilibrium,  expectations  are  realized  so  that:
A
Ar(p*;G/K) - A  (*)  ,  (lib)
which gives,
G  6(^)  i/a
(o-  +(*) ]   (12b)
The equilibrium growth rate then becomes,  in analogy with Section II.
A  1  G1  -a
0,r-  "( l-).1+6(  -i a - p   (13b)
Finally, searching for a socially optimal  level  of lobbying, B**,
12
Again, in  analogy to  Section  II,  the  function  6  need not  (but may)
equal unity at  the origin, i.e.  6(0)  _ 1).
27A
that maximizes  A  in  (lOb), we  find:
6'(#  *)  a 6(*(1-  ) - 1  (14b)
1+6(u**)
Provided that  6(p)  is  steep near the  origin as before, Appendices
(iv-3)  and  (iv-4)  show that  the necessary and sufficient  condition for
A
i**  in  (14b)  to  exist and to  maximize  A  is  that  6(p**) >  (l-a)/a, or
7
equivalently  that  the  optimal  tax  rate  is  r(3**)  >  1-a.  Thus,  in
contrast  to Section  II,  a socially optimal  anti-tax lobbying  exists  if
the  corresponding  tax  rate  that  is  greater  than  the  productivity
parameter of public  investments.  This  condition is  exactly the  reverse
of  the  corresponding  condition  in  Section  II,  and  the  two  conditions
A
are  therefore mutually  exclusive of  each other.  In fact,  when A  can
A
be  maximized, the  aggregate  growth, A,  in  the  public  goods  case,  is  a
monotonically decreasing  function of f (seen by replacing  the  r(P3**)  <
1-a condition with r(,**) >  1-a in equation  (18));  and vice versa.
Result  7.  Conditions  on  the  production and political  technology  that
allow for a socially efficient anti-tax lobbying to  exist, are mutually
exclusive  of  those  that  can  support  the  existence  of  a  socially
efficient pro-public-goods lobbying.
Since r is a function of the political technology in either model,
the  inequalities  restrictions  above  are  rooted  on  a comparison  of  the
political and production technologies.  Although the  actual  features of
the  political  and  production  technologies  in  different  countries  can
only  be  known  empirically,  it  is  likely  that  r  <  .5  holds  for  most
countries.  On  the  other  hand,  as  was  discussed  earlier,  it  may  be
speculated that  less  developed countries  are  likely  to  have  a smaller
28share  of  private  investments  and a larger  share  of public  investments
in  their  GNP  (a <  1/2),  while  the  reverse  is  likely  to  hold  among
industrialized economies.  Under  these  circumstances  the condition T <
i-a  holds  among developing  economies,  ruling  out  the  possibility  that
anti-tax  lobbying  may  be  socially  efficient,  even  in  a  "potential"
sense.  As  for  industrialized  economies  both  inequalities  can  be
potentially  satisfied  in  the  plausible  range  of  r  and  a.  Which
inequality  is  actually  satisfied  will  depend  on  the  particular
political  and production  technologies  that  characterize  each  economy.
Finally,  note  that  the  parameter  restrictions  apply  only  to  P** not  P*
and  therefore  the  private  agents'  choice  of  lobbying  for  either
instrument is  not restricted, regardless  of which form of  lobbying may
be potentially efficient.
Comparison of P* and j**  is provided in Figure  4, conditioned on
rI  **  >  1- a.  Otherwise, only the  curve  A\ would be relevant.  Figure
4 is drawn according to equation (10b)--which shows that the maximum of
A
A  curve  equals  A -- and  following  the  steps  of  Section  II,  which  show
A  A
that  A  (8) is  downwardly  sloped  at  f*  (A /a80fl  <  0) and  Ar (;r)  is
upwardly  sloped  at  9**  (a  /al/pp  >  0).  Thus,  <**  <  8*,  as  before.
To  reduce  the  tax  rate,  atomistic  agents  overlobby  relative  to  a
socially  efficient  level;  this  time,  because  they  ignore  an  induced
reduction  the  provision  of  the  public  goods  that  stem  from  the  tax
cuts.  To summarize:
Result 3'.  Atomistic agents' optimal lobbying for tax cuts  is socially
excessive  and  thus  suboptimal,  as  they  ignore  the  reduction  in  the
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The  traditional  literature  on  public  choice  and  international
trade  has  emphasized  the  socially  undesirable  nature  of  lobbying  by
13 focusing  on the variants of rent seeking behavior.  These results  are
typically  derived  from  models  that  are  both  static  and  ignore  public
14 goods.  By  contrast,  this  paper  is  cast  in  the  dynamic  context  of  an
endogenous  growth  model,  in  which  public  goods  are  also  present.
Growth here is a consequence  of households  choosing among consumption,
capital  stock,  and  lobbying  level.
The paper shows  that when lobbying takes place for a public good,
there  can  exist  a  nonzero  level  of  lobbying  that  maximizes  aggregate
growth.  This  outcome  is first best,  if a social  planner  solution  is
ruled out, and second best  if a social  planner  could deliver  the  same
social  optimum  level  of  public  good  without  lobbying  by  the  public.
The  model  shows  that private  agents  overlobby relative  to  this  social
optimum as  they ignore the  aggregate tax implications  of their lobbying
activities.  Equilibrium  growth  rate  is  thus  below  this  aggregate
maximum rate.  Taxes in  this case  are driven by the need to  finance the
public expenditures which are  sought by lobbyists.  The model  predicts
a drop  in  intensity  of  lobbying  as  the  share  of private  inputs  rise
relative  to  public  inputs.  This  finding  implies  that  underdeveloped
3An exception is Bhagwati  (1980, 1982)  who points  that  if the  ex-anti
state of the economy is second best, lobbying may be welfare  improving.
14An  exception  is a  recent  paper  by  Cairns  (1989)  on  dynamic  rent
seeking.  Public  goods, however, do not enter  into this analysis.
30economies  with  large  a  share  of  public  relative  to  private  sector
should face  greater lobbying activity than industrialized economies.
If  lobbying  is  motivated by partly  selfish  reasons  so  that  free
ridership  does  not  become  the  dominant  outcome,  the  public  good  may
have  to  entail  certain  tangible  benefits  to  private  agents.  Thus,  a
model  of quasi  public goods  that  contains both  a private  and a public
component  is  developed  which  predicts  both  underlobbying  and
overlobbying as  being possible.  Which effect dominates  depends  on the
size of the  external effect.
Finally  when  lobbying  is  aimed  at  reducing  the  tax  rate  rather
than  increasing  the  provision  of  public  goods,  we  still  obtain  the
possibility  that  a  socially  efficient  lobbying  level  that  maximizes
aggregate  growth may  exist.  Agents  again  overlobby  relative  to  this
level,  this  time  because  they  ignore  the  under-provision  of  public
goods  that  result  from  anti-tax  lobbying  behavior.  Additionally,  we
find  that  a  socially  efficient  level  of  pro-public-goods  lobbying  and
anti-tax lobbying cannot simultaneously co-exist in the  same economy.
A  two household extension of this model  (Mohtadi and Roe,  1990) in
which  rival  lobbying occurs  for  a partially excludable  public  good is
currently  under  investigation.  Certain  interesting  game  theoretic
results  follow.  Other modifications  and  extensions  could  include  the
case  where  individuals  lobby  from  their  wealth  rather  than  income.
Finally, while  lobbying  expenditures  in  this  model  are  not  directly
productive  and  thus  lost  to  the  economy,  one  may  explore  the
implications  of  postulating  the  existence  of  a  sector  that  "produces"
lobbying services on behalf of households.  Expenditures by this  sector
are  still largely lost to  the economy, and thus  the  impact on aggregate
growth will be unaffected by postulating such a  sector.
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33Appendices
Appendix  ii-1:  Second Order Condition on  W  in  Section  II
The second order condition requires  that:
U  <  0,  U  <  0,  and  det  UP>  0
KK  /3  U  PKU
We  show  that  these  conditions  are  globally  satisfied  in  K  and  locally
satisfied  in  /,  at  P*.  First,  UKK  - U"  C  +  U'CK  But  from  equation
(11)  it  follows  that  CKK-  0.  Further,  U"  <  0  from  equation  (12).
KK
2
Therefore,  UK  <  0.  Next,  Ui  =- U"C  +  U'C  . But  optimization  with TKK  rer  K  K
respect  to  P  [equation  (14)]  means  C  (P*)  - 0.  (THis  can  be  readily
verified  by  differentiation  (11)  in  P  and  using  equation  (14)  in  the
result.)  Further,  from  (11)  one  finds  that:
1-3a
C  - (1-r) l/(l)[7(3)]  ) K -27(6)7'()  +
(1-(2a  )[1'  ()]2  +  (1-.)7(3)"(9)]
This  expression  is  negative  at  P*:  We  divide  the  analysis  into  two
cases;  a  : 1/2,  and  a  <  1/2.  First,  if  a  >  1/2,  1-2a  <  0,  and  thus  C0
<  0  by  the  above  expression.  Second,  if  a  <  1/2,  1-2a  >  0.  In  this
case,  focusing  on  the  first  two  terms  in  the  large  brackets,  note  that
1-  2a
C  <  0,  if  -27y()  +  (1-P)(1  ).'(a'  )  <  0,  i.e.,  if  [y'(P)/7(B)](1-B)
<  2a/(l-2a).  This  inequality is  satisfied by  the first order condition
(equation  14)  at  /-/*.  It  follows  that  Cf(P*)  <  0,  and  thus  U6(P*)
is  negative.  Now  the  determinant,  after  substituting  from  above,  is:KK  UK#  U  2  )  U  2 det  - U"  C  UC  - (UC
UK  U  K  C  - K
Since  U"  <  0,  and  C  <  0,  the  first  term  is  positive.  But  the  second
term  is  actually  zero  because  from  equation  (11)  C/K  - C /K  and
because  C(/3*)  - 0.  Thus  the  determinant  in  positive.  It  follows  that
the  second order condition is  satisfied for all K and for #*.
Appendix  ii-2:  Existence of  P*  to Maximize  A
First,  the  right  hand  side  (RHS)  of  equation  (14)  is  independent  of  P
while  the  left  hand  side  (LHS)  decreases  in  P.  Moreover,  LHS  is  above
RHS  at  P-0  (LHS(0)  - 7'(0)/7(0)  >  RHS(0),  as  lim  7'(P)  - c4) and  below
0  ->  0
it  at  -/=1  (LHS(1)  - 0  <RHS(1)).  Therefore  the  LHS  and  RHS  curves  cross
in  the  domain  of  /  e  (0,1],  as  is  depicted  in  Figure  Al.
A
Appendix  ii-3:  Existence of  /** to Maximize  A
First  the  LHS  of  equation  (19)  is  positive.  Then  for  /** to  exist  it
is  necessary that  the  RHS  of  (19)  be  positive  which  implies  that  7(/**)
<  (l-a)/a.  Further,  the  RHS  of  equation  (19)  is  increasing  in  /  but
the LHS  (same as  equation  (14))  decreases  in /.  Moreover, LHS is above
RHS  at  3=0  (LHS(0)  - 7'(0)/7(0)  >  RHS(0),  as  lim  y'(P)  c o)  and  below
-> 0
it  at  l=1  (LHS(1)  - 0  <RHS(1)).  Then  the  two  curves  must  cross  in  the
domain  of  p  e  (0,1],  as  shown  in  Figure  A2.
A
Appendix  ii-4:  Concavity of  A
A
Global  concavity  of  A  cannot  be  established  in  this  case.  To  check  forA
the  local  concavity  of  A, differentiate  equation  (18)  twice,  and use
the first  order  condition  on  6**  (eq.  19)  to  obtain:
-- 2
A1
aa2  21/a1  Br**"  [9+]/"  [  l+  1 ->"()  ()]
[  1+-(.).  ]  7  . , (  )
1-  y(  [  )  ]2  (j6
a  l+-(  )  l**
In  this  expression,  the  last  two  terms  inside  the  large  brackets
(second  line)  are  negative.  Also,  the  second  product  in  the  first
A
term,  [ (1-9)7"(f)-7'(6)],  is  negative.  Thus  a2A/a8p(p**)  is  negative
if  the  first  product  is  negative,  i.e.  if  y(P**)  <  (l-a)/a.  This  was
also the necessary condition for the  existence of $**.  (Appendix ii-3).
A
It  is  now also sufficient for  concavity of A  at f**.
Appendix  iii-l:  Existence of  P**  in  the  Case of  Quasi Public Goods
This  analysis  is  similar  to  Appendix  ii-3.  First  note  that  the  LHS  of
equation  (13a)  is positive.  Thus  a necessary  condition  for  f**  to
exist  is  for  its  RHS  to  be  positive  or  that  -y(**)/[l+-y(**)]  <  1  -
a/(l+e).  Further,  the  RHS  rises  in  P and  the  LHS  falls.  Moreover,  LHS
is  above  RHS  at  9-0  (LHS(0)  -7'(0)/7(0)  >  RHS(0),  as  lim  7'(6)  - co)
P - 0
and  below  it  at  8-1  (LHS(l)  - 0  <RHS(1)).  It  follows  that  the  two
curves  cross  in  the  domain  of  ~  c (0,1]  (The  figure  resembles  A2  and
is  not  repeated  here.)
A
Appendix  iii-2:  Concavity of  A in  the Case of  Quasi Public Goods
Again,  only  local  concavity  will  be  established  as  in  Appendix  ii-4.Differentiating  equation  (12a) twice,  and using  equation  (13a)  on the
first  order  condition  for  3**  we  find:
1+E --  -2
2  2•(+6)  [  ]  +(2*
8/8  (1+e)/a L+'(6) a[l1+y(1 )]
- (l-)(l+)[  (  2  ,/]  1
In  this  expression,  the  first  product  inside  the  large  brackets,  is
simply  the  right  hand  side  of  the  first  order  condition  for  8**,  i.e.
equation  (13a)  and  is  positive  if  the  condition  for  the  existence  of
9**  ,  i.e.  y/[l+y]  <  1  - a/(l+e)  holds  from  the  previous  appendix.
Since  the  second  product  is  negative  the  entire  product  is  negative  in
this  case.  The  remaining  terms  on  the  second  line  are  clearly
A
negative,  rendering  a8  A/8 1 2(1**)  negative  when  the  above  condition
holds.  Thus  7/[l+y]  <  1  - a/(l+e)  is  both  the  necessary  condition  for
the  existence  of  P**  and  the  sufficient  condition  for  the  concavity  of
A
A(f)  at  9**.
Appendix  iv-1:  Second  Order Condition on  W  in  Section IV
The  second  order  conditions  for  maximization  of  W in  Section  III  differ
from  Section  II  (Appendix  1)  in  some  respects.  First,  the  term  CKK  in
the  UKK  expression  is  now  negative.  Thus,  UKK  is  still  negative;  also
the  term C  in U•  expression, evaluated locally at  3*  is:
C  (1*)  - - 1[  I-  63"().KaG
1 - l  a
(1+6  (3))
3This  expression  is  negative  as  6" >  0,  and  6' <  0, guaranteeing  that
U  P  (i*)  <  0.  Finally,  the  determinant expression  is  the  same  as  in 2  2
Section  II,  equaling U"  C  U'C  - (U'C).  The  first  term  in  this
K  C  - K )   Th
expression  is  positive  at  9*,  while  CBK  in  the  second  part  equals PK
-aC  /K which vanishes  locally at P*.  Thus  the determinant  is  positive
and  the  second  order  condition  is  locally  satisfied  in  f  and  globally
satisfied in K.
Appendix  iv-2:  Existence of  1* to  Maximize  A
The  left  and  right  hand  sides  of  equation  (9b)  are  both  decreasing
functions of P (aLHS/a3,  8RHS/81  <0).  However LHS  is above RHS  at P-0
(LHS(0)  - -6'(0)  ->  C,  as  lim 6'(P)  - -c),  and  below  it  at  6 -1
P -> 0
(LHS(1) - 0 <  RHS(1)).  Therefore,  the  two  curves  cross  in  the  domain
of p  e  (0,1],  as  shown in Figure A3.
A
Appendix iv-3:  Existence of  P** to Maximize A
First  note  that  the  LHS  of  equation  (14b)  is  negative.  Thus  a
necessary  condition  for  1**  to  exist  is for  its  RHS  to  be  negative
which  implies  that  6(p**) >  (l-a)/a.  Unlike previous  cases,  however,
the LHS  of equation  (14b) is not monotonic  in 1 (8LHS/81  0) while the
RHS rises  in P.  However, the  two curves will still cross in the domain
of P, because the LHS  is below RHS  at 1-0  (LHS(0) - 6'(0)/6(0) --  - C,
as  lim 6'(f)  - -co),  and above  it at 1  -1 (LHS(1) - 0 >  RHS(1).  This  is
P -> 0
shown in Figure A4.  As  shown in the  figure, the ambiguity in the  slope
of  LHS(9)  is necessarily  a  local  phenomenon  as  shown,  owing  to  the
endpoint condition on y(0).A
Appendix iv-4:  Concavity of A
A
Global  concavity  of  A  cannot  be  established  as  in  Section  II.  To
A
check  for  the  local  concavity  of  A, differentiate  equation  (lOb),  and
use  the first order condition on P**  (eq. 14b)  to  obtain:
(1/a)-2
aa A  /  **  ('/)+1I S[1+  (#)]
- aV'()[(1-p)6  '()  +]]1|**
Next, we  use  the  first  order condition on  **  (eq. 14b)  for a second
time,  to re-express  the  term on the second line, above,  as:
- a6" ()  )[-a(1+6([)]  [ (6'(P)  -[)+ 2 )1].j  (a)
A
It  can now be  shown  the  AT  /AQ  2(**) is  negative  if  [l-a(l+6(**)  <
0, i.e.  if 6(p**) >  (l-a)/a.  First,  this condition guarantees  that the
product  on  the  first  line  of  the  expression  for  82A /  2 (3**)  is
negative.  Next,  it  also  guarantees  that  the  expression
2
[a(6(8**) -1)+1]  in  the  expression  (a),  above,  is  positive  so  that
expression  (a)--which  replaces  the  second  line  of  A /a 2--is  the
product  of  three  negative  terms  and  is  itself  negative.  To  see  why
[a(6(P**) -1)+1]  is  positive,  use  the  condition  6(p**)  >  (l-a)/a  to
find  that  [a(6(f**)2-l)+l]  >  (1-a)2/a +  (1-a) which  is  itself positive
since  a  <  1.  Q.E.D.  The  condition  6(9**)  >  (l-a)/a  was  also  the
necessary condition  for  the  existence  of  9**.  (Appendix iv-3).  It  is
A
now also sufficient for concavity of A  at  B**. 7Q( S of  eq.  14)
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